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'RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-PRIOR
RESTRAINT ON MOTION PICTURE EXHIBITION
Petitioner, a motion picture distributor, refused to submit the movie
"Don Juan" for "examination or censorship" required by the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago' and accordingly was denied a license
to exhibit the film. Subsequently, the distributor sought an injunction
to restrain city officials from interfering with the exhibition of the
motion picture on the narrow ground that the ordinance, on its face,
constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech within the prohibition of the first and fourteenth amendments. In affirming a dismissal
of the complaint by the district court,2 the court of appeals 3 held
that a justiciable controversy had not been presented. On certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed (5-4). The
Court found that a justiciable controversy had been presented but
that an ordinance requiring submission of motion pictures for examination or censorship as a prerequisite to the granting of a license for
public exhibition is not invalid per se as a prior restraint on freedom
of speech within the prohibition of the first and fourteenth amendments. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
Although freedom of expression has never been regarded as absolute,4 the Supreme Court has always disapproved of prior restraints
1. Section 155-4 provides: "Such permit shall be granted only after the
motion picture film for which said permit is requested has been produced at

the office of the commissioner of police for examination, or censorship
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 44 n.1 (1961).

.

2. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 180 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
3. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. "[Tlhe protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases." Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.). For an
analysis of the Court's concept of prior restraint in the Near case, see
CHAFFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 375-81 (1941); Emerson,
The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 652-55 (1955);

Note, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 1148 (1931). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The theory that construes the first amendment as
an enactment of Blackstone's statement that "liberty of the press ... consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications and not in freedom from

censure for criminal matter when published" has been criticized as too
narrow in that obviously the threat of subsequent punishment may be so
great as to amount to an effective prior restraint, and too broad if taken

literally as a total prohibition on previous restraints. See

CHAFFEE, FREEDOM

9-11 (1941). Two formidable opponents of
censorship, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black, make no claim to
absolute privilege, but would allow suppression only when expression is so
closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it. See,
e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
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upon speech 5 and the press.6 It is equally true, however, that free
expression through the motion picture medium has been viewed by
a majority of the Court with a great deal of reservation. In the initial
test of the states' power to pre-censor films, the Supreme Court found
that movies were mere commercial spectacles which were "capable of
evil," and not to be considered an organ of the press.7 Following this
decision censorship in this country has been confined almost exclusively to the motion picture.8 Only within the past decade has the
Court indicated at least a partial reversal of its attitude9 toward
movie censorship. In the now famous case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 0 motion pictures were added to that category of free speech
and press within the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments, but in the same opinion the Court cautiously pointed out that
films might well possess some special "capacity for evil" which would
warrant controls not imposed upon other media. 1 Following Burstyn
5. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
6. "[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen,
283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (Hughes, C. J.).
7. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). Although
no federal rights were involved in the Mutual case, the Court merely ruling
upon film censorship under the Ohio Constitution, nevertheless this decision
remained a major obstacle to opponents of film censorship for over thirty
years.
8. Since the Near decision there have apparently been no attempts to license or pre-censor the press. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 662 (1955). Certain forms of prior restraint,
however, have been exercised upon the press in time of war and by the postal
authorities. Note, 71 HAnv. L. Rnv. 326 n.1 (1957). But see Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (Louisiana license tax on newspapers
and periodicals struck down as an effective prior restraint). Compare Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (injunction to restrain the sale
of obscene books after publication held not a prior restraint on the press),
with Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute authorizing
the abatement of defamatory newspapers as a public nuisance invalidated as
an effective prior restraint). On this point see Desmond, Legal Problems
Involved in Censoring Media of Mass Communications, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 38,
44-45 (1956). For a discussion of the injunction as a form of prior restraint
see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRos. 648,
655-56 (1955).
9. It appears that this change of judicial attitude is due largely to an effective self-imposed censorship through the industry's Production Code Administration coupled with a growing realization of the potentiality of motion
pictures in the expression of political and social ideas. For a discussion of the
operation and effect of the Production Code Administration see Note, 71
HARV. L. REv. 326, 327, 354-58 (1957).

10. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The question of state censorship of motion pictures was not considered by the.Court following Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), until after a series of decisions had determined that the first amendment prohibitions against federal abridgement of
civil rights applied with equal vigor to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Forecast by way of dictum in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Mutual decision was formally overruled in the Burstyn case.
11. "[C]apacity for evil ... may be relevant in determining the permissible
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it was assumed by some that motion pictures were entitled to the
same protection against prior restraints as afforded the press12-an
assumption reinforced by the fact that not a single specific attempt at
motion picture censorship to reach the Supreme Court has been upheld since 1952.13 On the other hand the Court has consistently indicated by way of dicta that a narrowly drawn licensing statute might
be upheld,14 and further intimated that it was no longer willing to
invalidate state legislation solely on the basis of prior restraint. 15
scope of community control . . . it does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places.... Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression." Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 10, at 502-3. Proponents of censorship contend that protection of the public, children in particular, can only be
accomplished by a system of prior restraint upon motion pictures, due to their
vividness and the greater rapidity with which they reach the general public.
See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 4 N.Y.2d
349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958); 8 VAND. L. REV. 638 (1954).
12. The highest courts of three states invalidated their state censorship
statutes, and the number of cities engaged in movie censorship, once estimated at ninety, fell to fewer than twenty. At present there are four states

and an estimated eleven cities engaged in movie censorship. See Note, 71

L. REv. 326, 328 (1957). Some opinions indicate that the Court felt
there was no longer a valid distinction between motion pictures and the press.
E.g., Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 333 Mass. 58, 127
N.E.2d 891 (1955).
It would seem that at least a part of this confusion was due to the fact that
the precise nature of the exceptions to the doctrine of prior restraint had
never been fully examined by the Court. In the Near case it was pointed out
that publications obstructive of the nation's war effort or inciting to crime
might be suppressed (the Court cited Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919)); it was added that "the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum). It has been submitted that this entire portion
of the opinion was not well considered and further suggested that the Chief
Justice's reference to obscenity may have been merely to make the traditional
point that obscene publications are subject to subsequent punishment as an
exception to the first amendment. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAw & CONTE M. PRon. 648, 661 (1955). It appears to have been generally
understood, however, that prior restraint was indicated. See Chaplinsky v.
New Hampsire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
13. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S.
684 (1959); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per
curiam); Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per
curiam); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 346
U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam); Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Educ., 346 U.S.
587 (1954) (per curiam). Apparently all of the statutes involved in these
cases failed to meet the requirements of procedural due process in that the
standards involved were too vague and indefinite. See Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46 n.3 and accompanying text (1961). For a
criticism of the per curiam practice see Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam
Practice: a Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV. 707, 719-21 (1956). But see Lockhart &
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MmN. L. REV. 5, 121 (1960), to the effect that the Court is wise in moving
slowly in the "elusive and dangerous" field of obscenity.
14. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 505-06 (1952); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 689-90
HARV.

(1959).

15. "The generalization that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious in
civil liberties cases must yield to a more particularistic analysis." Kingsley
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Moreover, the decision in Roth v. United States,16 that "obscenity" is
not "speech" within the meaning of the first amendment, was certainly not unfavorable 7 to censorship statutes directed primarily at
the restraint of obscene films.
In the instant case the only issue considered by the Court was
whether the city of Chicago could constitutionally require that motion pictures be inspected or censored before the issuance of a permit
for public exhibition of the film within the jurisdiction. 18 The
majority holding represents the Supreme Court's first pronouncement
that licensing statutes, placing a prior restraint on motion pictures,
are not on their face violative of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Court reviewed its past holdings dealing with the free speech guaranties and concluded that there are certain narrow exceptions to the
prohibition against prior restraint, 19 placing particular emphasis upon
the obscenity exception.2 0 The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice
Clark, reiterated that motion pictures possess a capacity for evil which
the community may thwart in the most effective manner2 1 and
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957). The Court quoted from Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 539 (1951). A
similar objection to an axiomatic approach to the problem of prior restraint
was voiced against the Supreme Court's decision in the Near case. 16 MINN.
L. REv. 97 (1931).

16. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In the Roth decision the Court categorically excluded obscenity as without redeeming social importance and hence not

"speech" within the constitutional meaning. Petitioner's contention that constitutional rights were being denied since proof was not required that
obscenity presented a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct or would
probably induce its recipients to such conduct was expressly rejected. The
petitioner's contentions were apparently based on Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). There
has been a great deal of controversy as to whether obscenity has a substantial causal relation to immoral action. For discussions to the effect that the
danger of obscenity has not been sufficiently demonstrated to justify the
validity of obscenity regulations, see the concurring opinion of Judge Frank
in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956), and Lockhart &
McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 587, 593, 596
(1955); Note, 11 WESTERN REs. L. REV. 669 (1960). But see Erbe & Craig,
Freedom From Obscenity, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 123 (1961); Desmond, Legal
Problems Involved in Censoring the Media of Mass Communications, 40 MARQ.
L. REV. 38 (1956).
17. Although the Roth case, supra note 16, dealt with subsequent restraint,
it would seem highly unlikely that a court holding obscenity as not within
constitutionally protected speech would deny the state all authority to deal
with obscene films. Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1958 Term, 58
MicH. L. REv. 165, 203-05 (1959).
18. The content of the film was not involved or examined nor were the
standards of the ordinance considered by the Court.
19. See notes 4 and 12 supra.
20. Although much of the opinion dealt with the obscenity exception the
Court did not expressly exclude incitement to riot or forceful overthrow of
the government as proper subjects for pre-censorship.
21. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Warren, joined by Mr. Justice
Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, did not agree that licensing or censorship were considered within the "exceptional cases" discussed
in the Near decision. The Chief Justice emphasized the adverse practical
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in conclusion pointed out that the instant holding was limited specifically to movies, since each method of expression tends to present its
own peculiar problems.
It is clear from the majority opinion that pre-censorship of motion
pictures22 on the basis of obscenity 23 constitutes a valid exception to
the general prohibition against prior restraints. Theoretically the
decision does not authorize rampant censorship, 24 and earlier cases
indicate that the Court would put narrow limits upon the censor's
discretion.m Presumably the determination that a film is obscene must
be based upon a finding that the picture, viewed as a whole, has a
dominant appeal to a prurient interest. 26 Assuming that administraeffect of an administrative licensing system upon free speech and pointed to
the fact that Chicago had resorted to pre-censorship without any apparent
attempt to devise other less objectionable methods of control. Further, the
dissenters objected to the majority's failure to distinguish motion pictures
from other media and indicated that a possible showing that motion pictures
do in fact produce a greater impact upon the public would not justify censorship of the entire industry. In a separate and concurring dissent, Mr. Justice
Douglas characterized censorship as repugnant to a free and democratic
society, reiterating the traditional distrust of the censor's power.
22. As to whether licensing and pre-censorship on the basis of obscenity
would be upheld in other areas of communications, the Court made no
commitments. The opinion seems to imply that pre-censorship would not be
valid in all areas. It is suggested that it is doubtful that the rule of the
instant case would be extended to the press or individual speech. See Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945). Logically, however, it would seem that the categorical exclusion
of obscenity from protected speech would allow prior restraint on this basis
in any area of expression. On the propriety of making broad distinctions
between protected and unprotected speech, James Madison asserted that it
would subvert the first amendment to make "a distinction between the freedom and the licentiousness of the press." PADoER, THE COMPLETE MADIsON
267, 268-69 (1953), quoted in Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir.
1956).
23. Censorship of movies which create an imminent danger to the government or incite to riot would probably also be sustained. See note 20 supra.
"The Respectful Tramp," a movie dealing with the racial problem in the
South, was reportedly banned by a Virginia board of censors on the
ground that it "would tend to incite violence." The Board's determination
was upheld by the Richmond Circuit Court on the authority of the instant
case. Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1961, p. A-10, col. 1.
24. "(Clensorship of obscenity has almost always been both irrational and
indiscriminate." Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and
the Constitution, 38 MixNN. L. REV. 295, 371 (1954). See notes 27, 28 and 32
infra.
25. See note 13 supra.
26. The Roth case placed the determination of obscenity on the basis of
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). It has been suggested that very few movies are so devoid of content as to be censorable under
the Roth test. 13 VAND. L. R.V. 541, 546 n.26 (1960). Professors Lockhart and
McClure submit that the concept of obscenity held by most members of the
Court is probably "hard-core pornography." Lockhart & McClure, Censorship
of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5,
58-68 (1960). It would seem that practically the only films constitutionally
censorable on the grounds of obscenity would be so called "stag movies"
which for obvious reasons would never be submitted to a censorship board.
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tive censorship boards are capable 1 and desirous28 of following
strict statutory standards, 29 the decision of the Court appears acceptable. It is at least arguable that the protection of the general public
from obscene films is paramount to the individual's interest in free
speech. 30 The problem of dealing with the obscene, however, will
always be more tangible to the community than seemingly abstract
constitutional principles of free speech. The Court, in reviewing the
means which the community has chosen for its protection, must
necessarily approach the problem from a broader perspective. It
3$
would seem that the basic issue involved, where the method of
"'[Glenuine pornography is almost always underworld, it doesn't come into
the open.'" Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684, 692 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion) (quoting D. H.
LAURENCE,

PORNOGRAPHY

AND

OBSCENITY 12, 13). A statute requiring that all

movies be submitted for inspection because they might be obscene appears
hardly justified when a comparatively negligible number may be validly
censored.
27. One of the basic objections to censorship has been that as a general
rule the censor is totally unqualified to pass upon literary merits. A number
of censorship boards are composed of policemen, housewives and "leading
citizens." Chicago's censors are generally policemen's widows; the chief
censor there is a police sergeant who reportedly declared, "if a picture is
objectionable for a child, it's objectionable, period." A Memphis housewife
and part-time censor recently commented, "I have heard twice in pictures a
word I have never heard used before. S-L-U-T." Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1961,
p. 90. For a discussion of the make-up and operation of censorship boards,
see Note, 71 HARv. L. REV. 326, 328-31 (1957). See GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 72-74 (1956).
28. "During the trial of the Times Film vase . . .the censor was presented
with a definition of obscenity which was the same as that given by the state
supreme court. Despite the fact that she was supposed to follow this definition, the censor stated that she did not consider it adequate .

. . ."

Note, 71

HARV. L. REV. 326 n.88, (1957). A persuasive argument is based upon the
premise that the requirements of due process cannot be met by censorship
statutes since in the final analysis the censor's determinations are based upon
his own concept of decency and obscenity which in turn depend upon different
religious, social and educational backgrounds. See Note, 23 ALBANY L. REV.
152, 158-59 (1959).
29. The Courts have struggled for years to resolve an adequate standard
for the determination of obscene material. See generally Lockhart & McClure,
Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 587 (1955). Many consider the present Roth test as inadequate and contend that it adds nothing
of value in the determination of the obscene. See 36 TEXAS L. REV. 226, 228
(1957); Note, 11 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 669, 672-74 (1960). If the courts have
been unable to agree upon what constitutes obscenity it is equally clear that
the censor is in no better position.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. Opponents of censorship have contended that subsequent restraints are
entirely adequate for the control of obscene films, pointing not only to
criminal punishment as a deterrent, but also to the informal control by
audiences in view of their power by voluntary boycotts to ruin both the
producer and the theatre if really objectionable pictures were forced upon
them. See CHAFFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 542 (1941).
Petitioner's contention in the instant case, that the state's sole remedy against
the showing of an obscene film was under the Illinois pornography statute
and then only after a transgression, was expressly rejected. 365 U. S. at 49.
For a discussion and differentiation of the practical results flowing from the
use of prior and subsequent restraints upon speech, see Emerson, The Doctrine
of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMI'. PROs. 648, 655-60 (1955).
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restraint is challenged, is whether such method has an adverse effect
upon the unassailable public interest in free access to protected speech.
From this point of view, past experience with administrative precensorship offers little assurance that free speech will not be suppressed at the arbitrary discretion of the censor. Procedural disadvantages 33 together with the discouraging aspect of costly and time
consuming litigation weigh heavily against the prospect that the
censor's mistakes will be corrected by appeal to the courts.34 Furthermore, when faced with the possibility that costly productions may be
cut or banned by numerous censorship boards with their various codes,
it is not likely that the motion picture industry will reflect important
controversial issues of immediate interest to the public. The majority
opinion in the instant case is apparently based upon the unexplained
presumption that motion pictures are somehow different3 5 from other
media and therefore particularly susceptible to pre-censorship, an
argument which, it is submitted, is altogether unconvincing.3 6 Per32. An examination of motion pictures which have been cut or banned
completely, reveals innumerable unwarranted supressions. E.g., "Anatomy of
a Murder," "Curley," "Joan of Arc," "Idiot's Delight," "The Great Dictator,"
"Potemkin," and Walt Disney's "Vanishing Prairie." 365 U.S. at 69-72 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting). For a more complete list of the censors' absurdities see 60
YALE L.J. 696, 699-700 nn.7 & 8 (1951). An Atlanta censor who last year
banned eleven movies including "Room at the Top" and "Birth of a Nation,"
indicated that she was reassured by the Court's decision in the instant case
and stated, "I'm having a big hassle right now trying to cut two 'bastards'
and a 'by God' from a British movie." Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1961, P. 89.
33. Once the censors determine that a motion picture is obscene the burden
of proving the contrary will be placed upon the exhibitor, should he pursue
a judical remedy. See note 31 supra.
34. Litigation in the instant case consumed approximately three years. "The
Miracle," which was the subject of dispute in the Burstyn case, was five years
in the courts; even then, after the censors' determination was reversed, the
movie was never shown in Chicago. 365 U.S. at 73. "Of the forty-three films
which were altered or banned by the Maryland State Board of Motion
Picture Censors during a recent two year period, litigation followed in only
two cases." 71 HARV. L. REV. 326, 339 n.93 (1957).
35. The Court did not attempt to distinguish between movies and other
media, nor did the opinion indicate that any different rule would apply to
newsreels or documentary films. It has been suggested that motion picture
censorship may be vulnerable to attack under the equal protection and
commerce clause of the Constitution. Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326, 334-35 (1957).
The majority offered no explanation to substantiate the proposition that
motion pictures possess some special "capacity for evil." Cf. note 11 supra.
It is interesting to note that "capacity for evil" was one of the bases for the
now overruled holding in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S.
230 (1915). See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 702-03 (1951). "[I]t is arguable that
much of our film censorship is a left-over from the era of Prohibition."
CHAFFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 544 (1941).

36. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Warren, the
proposition that motion pictures have a greater impact upon the public and
therefore should be censored was basically the same argument advanced
against newspapers at the time of the invention of the printing press. 365
U.S. at 77. (dissenting opinion). In support of the proposition that motion
pictures should be less censorable because of their greater impact upon the
public, see CHAFFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 543-48 (1941);

Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 669
(1955).
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haps more difficult to accept is the paternalistic 37 implication of the
Court's decision, in its underlying denial of the individual's ability to
choose between good and evil.
Considering the dangers to free
speech inherent in pre-censorship, it is suggested that the state has
failed to bear the heavy burden 39 of proof which would warrant prior
restraint in an area designated by the Supreme Court as "a significant
medium for the communication of ideas. 40

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-YEAR AND A DAY RULE
REJECTED IN PENNSYLVANIA
Defendant was indicted for murder and manslaughter. Both indictments alleged that the deceased was assaulted by defendant on September 21, 1958, from which death ensued on November 1, 1959.
The defendant moved to quash the indictments claiming that the
common law of Pennsylvania prohibited prosecution for murder
when death occurs more than a year and a day after the assault. The
37. The assumption that the general public is unable to recognize and reject
pornography without the help of a censor is hardly compatible with democratic
ideals. "Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent
crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgement
of the rights of free speech .

. . ."

Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents

of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (quoting from the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378
(1927)). See Note, 71 HARv. L. REV. 326, 353, 367 (1957); Note, 11 WESTERN RES.
L. REv. 679 (1959). An argument for pre-censorship based solely upon the protection of youth from obscene films is more plausible; however, there appear
less onerous methods of restraint which would afford adequate protection for
minors. For a discussion of age classification as a more meaningful basis
for a constitutional distinction between prior restraints as applied to adults
and children, see Note, For Adults Only: The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classification,69 YALE L.J. 141 (1960).
38. There is a great deal of truth in the "old adage that every man should
have the right to go to hell in his own way." Note, 34 ORE. L. Rsv. 250, 251
n.2 (1955).
39. See Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952). "The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
40. Id. at 501. The decision in the instant case has received an adverse
reaction by numerous members of the press. See Publishers Weekly, Feb.
6, 1961, vol. 179, No. 6, p. 68; The Commonweal, Feb. 10, 1961, vol. 63, No. 20,
pp. 495-96; The Christian Century, Feb. 8, 1961, pp. 163-64; New York Times,
Feb. 25, 1961, p. 12C. An appeal for rehearing of the instant case was filed
on Feb. 27, 1961. Simultaneously, seven organizations in the field of communication filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioner: The
American Society of Newspaper Editors, The National Association of Broadcasters, Society of Magazine Writers, The American Society of Magazine
Photographers, The Authors League, American Book Publishers Council, and
Motion Picture Association of America. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1961, p. 37 col. 1.
The petition for rehearing was subsequently denied. 29 U.S.L. WEEic 3277
(U.S. Mar. 21, 1961).
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trial court overruled the motion. On appeal, held, affirmed. The common law rule which precluded an indictment for murder where death
did not occur until more than a year and a day after the assault is a
rule of evidence only and can be changed by judicial decision.1 Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1960).
At the common law, in order to constitute punishable homicide, it
was necessary that death ensue within a year and a day from the
infliction of a mortal wound by the defendant. 2 Unless death took
place within this period, the common law drew the conclusion that
death had not resulted from this injury and/or that the cause of
death could not be discovered. Neither the court nor the jury was
allowed to reach a different result.3 It is usually thought that this
rule grew out of the limitations and uncertainties of the medical
knowledge of ancient times. 4 Today some jurisdictions treat the rule
as one of evidence that has the effect of a conclusive presumption
that death resulted from other causes.5 Still other jurisdictions
regard death within a year as part of the substantive definition of
murder. 6 Whichever way the rule is considered, the effect on successful prosecution of murder is the same. In at least one jurisdiction the
necessity that death result within a year and a day has been abrogated
by statute.7 The common law rule, however, still prevails in an overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions and is apparently applicable
in federal court prosecutions.8
In the instant case the majority opinion carefully reviewed the
authorities on this rule and recognized that the majority of jurisdictions still follow the year and a day limitation. Since Pennsylvania

1. In the case of Commonwealth v. Evaul, 5 Pa. D. & C. 105 (1922), the court
held that the common law rule was not applicable in prosecutions for involuntary manslaughter.
2. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 197; 9 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND § 734,
at 428 (2d ed. 1931); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 191 (1957);
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 605 (1957); 1 WARREN, HOM-ICIDE § 60 (1938).
3. State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); Rose v. Commonwealth,
156 Ky. 817, 162 S.W. 107 (1914); State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139 (1826); Percer
v. State, 118 Tenn. 765, 103 S.W. 780 (1907).
4. Cf. People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v.
Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933).
5. People v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 (1870); Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24
S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17 (1876).
6. Glover v. State, 166 Ark. 588, 172 S.W. 876 (1915); Clark v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 18 S.E. 440 (1893); State v. Champoux, 33 Wash. 339, 74
Pac. 557 (1903).
7. See People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934), where the
court held that since the Penal Code made no reference to the rule, the legislature must have intended that the rule no longer be a necessary requirement
in prosecution for murder. Some states have expressly enacted the common
law rule into their statutes. E.g., REv. CODE OF MONT. § 10961 (1921).
8. See Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894); Ball v.
United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891).
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has no statutory definition of the crime of murder, 9 the majority
adopted the Blackstonian definition as embodying the correct law
on the year and a day rule in Pennsylvania. Because Blackstone made
no reference to the rule when gi'fing the definition of murder, the
rule is not a part of the substantive definition of murder, the majority
reasoned, but only a rule of evidence. Relying on the latin phrase
cessante ratione legis cessat 1ex l0 the court concluded that the archaic
rule is no longer supported by reason" and has no relevance in determining the question of causation. As a rule of evidence only, the year
and a day requirement could be eliminated without making the court
guilty of judicial legislation.' 2
Although the soundness of the rationale 13 of the instant case is
questionable, the result reached seems desirable. 14 The many criti9. The Pennsylvania General Assembly, however, by its Act of January 28,
1777, 46 P.S. § 152 proclaimed that the common law and the statutes of England that had been in force in Pennsylvania would be "in force and binding
on the citizens of Pennsylvania."
10. The correct phrase is cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, meaning
"the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK, LAW DicTioNARY (4th ed. 1951) ; Nice's Appeal, 54 Pa. 200 (1867).
11. The court took judicial notice of the advances in scientific crime detection and scientific medicine. See also People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266
N.Y.S. 86, 88 (1933), where the court said: "Great advances have been made
in medicine and surgery, and the doubt that the blow was the cause of death,
when the latter ensued a year and a day after the former, has, in a large
measure, been removed. Frequently there is now light where once there was
darkness."
12. While the majority struggles to avoid judicial legislation and attempts
to justify its decision by labeling the rule one of procedure, it is well settled
that there is an established exception to the adoption, in an American state,
of the English common law which allows the judiciary to throw off those
doctrines which are not suited to conditions in the state, and which would
have no reasonable application there. See the case of Gordon v. State, 93
Ga. 531, 21 S.E. 54 (1893) where the court refused to apply the common law
presumption that a boy under the age of fourteen is incapable of committing
rape, and the case of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
where the court changed the M'Naghten test for insanity. See also State
ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 322, 187 N.W. 830, 841 (1922) where the
court said that it was not wholly powerless to remold and reapply the ancient
rules so as to fit them to modern conditions. But cf. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d
420 (Fla. 1952), which held that if the common law adopted by the state is
clear, the court has no power to change it.
13. In the instant case Justice Musmanno in a rather emotional dissent
proceeded to show the logical errors committed by the majority in reaching
its decision. As he pointed out, the majority opinion cites a plethora of cases
supporting the opposite result; it even cites a Supreme Court case to
strengthen its position while the case actually recognizes that the majority of
states support the common law rule. Musmanno also queried the majority's
adoption of Blackstone as embodying the correct rule of law while disregarding the common law cases that Blackstone cites in favor of the rule, It is
submitted that, while Musmanno does point out the errors in the majority's
opinion, his attack fails to recognize that the majority still require the commonwealth to prove causation, and the mere removal of a technicality in prosecutions for murder does not subject the defendant to any less safeguards
that he had before the rule was struck down.
14. See People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933).
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cisms of the rule 5 seem well founded in view of the great advances in
medicine as an aid in tracing causation. Of course the abolition of the
rule does not mean that the defendant is now certain of conviction
since the prosecution must still prove that the defendant's act was
the proximate cause of the death. Moreover, the decision announced
in the instant case will probably not be followed. Until its complete
abrogation by statute, the year and a day rule will remain, in most
jurisdictions, a bar to murder prosecutions.

REAL PROPERTY-RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATIONCONVEYANCE GIVING HOUSING COOPERATIVE FIRST
OPTION TO BUY AND RIGHT TO REDEEM IS NOT AN
INVALID RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION
Homeowners organized a co-operative housing association to which
each conveyed his realty in exchange for a membership which carried
the privilege of using the property conveyed. The membership contract stipulated that the association had a first option to buy a
membership, or, if it were sold on the open market, the right to redeem
the membership within ninety days. The agreement also provided
that the association would temporarily convey the property to its
members for their mortgage financing. The association sued seven of
its members to compel reconveyance of property conveyed to them for
mortgage financing. The members raised the defense that the contract
was invalid because the option to buy and the power to redeem were
invalid restraints on alienation. The lower court ruled for the association. On appeal, heZd, affirmed. An agreement that a housing cooperative has a first option to buy a membership and the right to
redeem any membership sold on the open market is not a violation
of the rule against restraints on alienation of property. Gale v. York
Center Community Cooperative, 171 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1960).
Dissatisfied with the rigidities of feudal society,' the common law
developed a policy against restrictions on alienation of real and
15. See PEmaKs, CRIMNAL LAW 605 (1957); People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y.

100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); and the concurring opinion in the instant case by
Mr. Justice Bell who said: "The safety, the protection, and the welfare of
Society are paramount, and require that there be no rule of evidence or of
limitations for murder or for the prosecution of the murderer." 106 A.2d at 510.
(Emphasis supplied by the court.)
1. For early examples of the policy against restraints on alienation see
GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

Perpetuities§ 59 (1918).

§ 4 (2d ed. 1895); 21 R.C.L.
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personal property.2 This policy is based on the belief that restraints
remove property from commerce,3 concentrate wealth,4 prejudice
creditors, and discourage property improvements. 5 The restraining
clauses which the courts disapprove can be phrased in a variety of
ways. They can prevent alienation in absolute terms for any time
or to any group; or using limited terms, restrict alienation for a
certain time or to a certain group. 6 Restrictions may also be classified
as forfeiture restraints, which create a reversion or gift over to a third
party when alienation is attempted; promissory restraints, which are
contracts between grantor and grantee prohibiting alienation; or
disabling restraints, which simply nullify the transfer of ownership to
a party other than the grantee. 7 The majority of courts do not allow
forfeiture restraints, either limited or absolute, on fee simple estates.8
Limited or absolute forfeiture restraints on life or leasehold estates,
however, are generally valid.9 Promissory restraints are usually
treated the same as forfeiture restraints. 10 Disabling restraints on fee
simple estates are invalid, but a small minority of courts allow them
on life estates." The few cases which have been found dealing with
restrictions in cooperative housing agreements have involved apartment houses. The limited promissory restrictions challenged in these
2. For cases on restraint of personalty see cases mentioned in SIMES &
SMIT, FuTuRE INTERESTs §§ 360, 390 (2d ed. 1956). For restraints on alienation
of stock see Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958).
3. "[A]nd the tendency of our time is to greater freedom of sale and
transfer of property, unfettered by conditions or limitations of the right of
alienation." Haeusler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188, 19 S.W. 75, 77 (1892).
"It is contrary to public policy because it fetters and places unreasonable
restrictions upon property, which purport to remove it from the channels of
trade and commerce . . . ." Friswold v. United States Nat. Bank, 122 Ore.
246, 257 Pac. 818, 820 (1927).
4. Rundell, ConcentrationVersus Distributionof the Power of Alienation, 2
Wis. L. REV. 449 (1924).
5. See Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE
L.J. 961, 964 (1935).
6. Id. at 972.
7. Id. at 963; SIMEs & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 337; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 404 (1944).

8. See Schnelby, supra note 5, at 961, 972, 973 for cases following the
majority rule. In Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161,
227 N.W. 917 (1929), the court held valid a restriction created in a will
probated in 1915, preventing alienation of a fee simple estate until 1925. In
Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916), a
restriction preventing grantee from alienating while the grantor was living
was upheld. See also O'Conner v. Thetford, 174 S.W. 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1905).
In connection with this, see material cited in note 10 infra.
9. See cases in SnmEs & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 352, 353; Schnebly,
Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J. 1186, 1207, 1211
(1935). Restraints on life and leasehold estates have been justified by the fact
that they protect the reversioner and remainderman, and also by the fact that
these estates are not readily marketable.
10. Promissory restraints are primarily a part of contract law. SIMES &
SMITH, op. cit. supranote 2, at 353.
11. See cases mentioned in Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J. 1186, 1208 (1935).
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cases have been upheld.'2 The courts usually stress the leaseholding
rather than the stockholding aspects of the agreement 3 since restrictions on the alienation of stock also are invalid. 14
The court in the instant case decided that the utility of the restraints
outweighed the possible injurious consequences. Since a statute
provided that nonprofit housing co-operatives are legal, 5 the court
assumed that their encouragement is socially desirable, and it thought
that restraints are necessary for their existence. It said, without much
elaboration, that co-operative housing agreements do not seriously
involve the traditional dangers accompanying restraints.
The court was correct in its conclusion that restrictions are necessary incidents of co-operative housing agreements. The desire to live
among neighbors with similar social and economic backgrounds is the
main incentive for these agreements. 16 This desire cannot be satisfied
without the power to prevent sale of membership to individuals of
different backgrounds. Assuming that co-operatives are socially desirable, upholding the restrictions was the only logical alternative.
It is doubtful that agreements of this type seriously involve the
dangers traditionally associated with restraints on alienation. The
class to which the property can be alienated will usually be sufficiently
broad to keep the property within the flow of commerce and prevent
a concentration of wealth. As for the discouragement of improvements,
since the members live on the property they will usually maintain it
in good order. Under the agreement in the instant case, creditors are
not seriously endangered since members are allowed to mortgage the
property. In any agreement creditors will be unjustly hurt only if
they are led to believe that members have legal title to the property.
12. In Greene County Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Nelson, 234 Iowa 362, 12 N.W.2d
886 (1944), the court mentioned a state statute which permitted restrictions
on alienation of membership stock. In 68 Beacon St. Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass.
354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935), a co-operative apartment agreement which prevented
mortgaging or pledging the lease and provided that the stockholders mus*
consent to any transfer of lease and stock was upheld. In Penthouse Properties
Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave. Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939), a co-

operative apartment agreement which required that the lessor must consent
to a transfer of stock with its accompanying lease was upheld. This rule was
later modified by a case in which the court ruled that the lessor's refusal
could not be arbitrary. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 7 App. Div.2d 75, 180
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1958).
13. "The primary interest of every stockholder was in the long term
proprietary lease alienation of which the corporation had the power to
restrain. . . . The stock was incidental to that purpose and afforded the
practical means of combining an ownership interest with a method for sharing
proportionately the assessments for maintenance and taxes." Penthouse Properties Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave. Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417, 423
(1939).
14. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1322 (1958).
15. 171 N.E.2d at 33.
16. See Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida: A Legal Analysis,
12 U.

MIAMI

L. REV. 13 (1957) and 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 123 (1960).
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The creditor is hurt no more by agreements of this type than he is
when the debtor is a leaseholder. Members of co-operative associations
7
have been described as hybrids between stockholders and lessees.' It
is submitted that this court's decision refusing to apply the traditional
policy against restraints on alienation to a new form of land ownership
is correct.

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-UNCOMPENSATED CASUALTY
LOSS DUE TO DROUGHT ALLOWED AS
SECTION 165 DEDUCTION
A severe drought in 1954 killed taxpayer's residential trees and
shrubbery. The loss was not compensated for by insurance, and the
taxpayer took an ordinary loss deduction under section 165 (c) 3 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Commissioner denied the
deduction and assessed a deficiency, claiming this was a capital loss
under section 1231 and Treasury Regulation 1.1231-1 (e). On the
question of whether the loss was a casualty loss, the jury found for
the taxpayer. The district court held, however, for the Commissioner.,
On appeal, held, reversed. Section 1231 applies only to involuntary
conversions-compensated losses-leaving section 165 alone applicable
to uncompensated losses. Maurer v. United States, 284 F.2d 122 (10th
Cir. 1960).
The problem in this case is whether an uncompensated casualty
loss to residential shrubbery is an involuntary conversion within the
meaning of section 1231. Section 1231 provides:
If during the taxable year... the recognized gains from the compulsory
or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in
part... ) of... capital assets held for more than six months into property
or money, exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges and
conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses
from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than six months. 2
The Treasury Regulations provide that capital assets subject to
section 1231 treatment include only capital assets involuntarily converted,3 and that receiving compensation for the destroyed property
17. See Anderson, supra note 16; Hershman, How and Why of Real Estate
LAW 49 (1959).
1. Maurer v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 223 (D. Kan. 1959).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.

Syndications, 5 PRAc.

3. Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(a) (1960).
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4
is not a necessary element of a section 1231 involuntary .conversion.
The statute does not specifically require any quid pro quo for an involuntary conversion. The-term involuntary conversion as it is used
in some sections of the code clearly implies the receipt of money or
other property in exchange for the converted property. 5 In another
section, the words involuntary conversion do not seem to imply anything akin to an exchange. 6 The commentators are in conflict on this
point. Mertens states: "In the case of an involuntary conversion at a
loss in circumstances which do not involve a 'sale or exchange,' as
in the case of an uncompensated casualty loss, the loss normally
would be deductible as an ordinary and not a capital loss because of
the absence of a sale or exchange." 7 On the other hand, Alfred J.
McDowell has stated that "casualty losses of both business property
and capital assets held for more than six months had to be netted
against all gains realized .
*..."8
The legislative history of section
1231, though not specifically answering this question, contains language which permits the inference that receiving money or other
compensation is a necessary element- of an involuntary conversion.9
Thus, this court was forced to answer the question, "Is receiving
something in exchange for the converted property a necessary ingredient of an involuntary conversion?" with little help from statute,
legislative history, or prior case law.

4. "For purposes of section 1231, the terms 'compulsory or' involuntary conversion' and 'involuntary conversion' of property mean the conversion of
property into money or other property as a result of complete or partial destruction, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation, or the threat or imminence thereof. Losses upon the complete or
partial destruction, theft, seizure, requisition or condemnation of property are
treated as losses upon an involuntary conversion whether or not there is a
conversion of the property into other property or money ....
" Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1231-1(e) (1960).
5. As the term is used in §§ 1033 and 1034, the term involuntary conversion
carries with it the connotation of an involuntary sale or exchange in which
the taxpayer receives something in exchange for his converted property.
Section 1033 (a) (1) deals with conversions into similar property. Section
1033 (a) (2) deals with conversions into money occurring before 1951. Section
1033(a) (3) deals with conversions into money or property "not similar or
related in service." In each of these instances an event akin to a sale or
exchange occurs; the taxpayer receives something in exchange for the
converted property. See- also section 1034 dealing with the sale of residences
and 1033 (f) dealing with the sale or exchange of livestock because of drought.
6. Section 1033 (e) provides that if livestock are destroyed by or on account
of disease, or are sold or exchanged because of disease, such destruction or
sale or exchange shall be treated as an involuntary conversion.- Here nothing
akin to a sale or exchange is required if the livestock are destroyed. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1033(e)-1 (1960).
7. 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.125, at 517-18.
8. McDowell, Casualty Losses, 17 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 627, 650 (1959).
PRENTICE-HALL, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK (1961), states that an involuntary
conversion occurs "when property is destroyed in whole or in part, or is
stolen or seized, and property or money, such as insurance or condemnation
award, is received." Id. at 97.
9. H.R. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1942).
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The court held that "Section 1231 is aimed at involuntary conversions where 'other property or money' is received in return, i.e.,
compensated losses, leaving Section 165 applicable to uncompensated
losses."' 0 The court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, the
legislative history of section 1231 indicates that this section applies
only to compensated involuntary conversions." Second, section 1231
is contextually similar to the sections dealing with capital gains and
losses.12 The inference is that a 1231 involuntary conversion is a
"taxable event closely akin to a 'sale or exchange' albeit an involuntary one." In answer to the Commissioner's argument that this result
reads the definition of involuntary conversion out of the statute, the
court replied that the definition Still has application to compensated

losses.' 3
The rule laid down in the principal case is sound, notwithstanding
the Internal Revenue Service's announcement that the case will not
be followed. 14 In a prior case involving similar facts, the Commissioner did not raise the argument advanced in this case.15 If the
word conversion is given its ordinary meaning, 6 it is essential that
the taxpayer receive money or other property in exchange for the
converted property. Moreover, the legislative history of section 1231
is couched in terms of an exchange.17 This case leaves unanswered
what is probably the most difficult problem in this area. Suppose this
taxpayer had insurance which covered only a portion of the loss. The
opinion indicates that if compensation is received, there is a basis
for applying section 1231. Does this mean that the entire transaction
will be brought within section 1231? The answer to this question must
await future legislation or judicial decision.
10. 284 F.2d at 124.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. See note 5 supra.
13. 284 F.2d at 124.
14. Technical Information Release 304, March 16, 1961.
15. Buttram v. Jones, 87 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Okla. 1943). Here it was held
that a loss to residential property due to a severe drought was a casualty loss
and hence deductible under section 165 (section 23 of the 1939 code). If the
Commissioner's argument were accepted, a case like Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952), holding damage to a residence caused by
termites and hence deductible under section 165, would require the deduction
to be taken under section 1231.
16. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1955) defines "conversion" as converting "from one thing to another by substitute."
17. See note 9 supra.
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-FIREMAN IN PERFORMANCE
OF DUTIES ALLOWED RECOVERY AS INVITEE
Plaintiff, a fireman, was injured by the collapse of a wooden
staircase while fighting a fire in defendant's hotel. Defendant knew
that the building needed repairs and that it was being negligently
maintained in violation of certain fire ordinances. In an action for
personal injury, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant
notwithstanding the verdict.' On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Illinois, held, reversed. A fireman, rightfully on the premises of
another, may recover for the landowner's failure to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of his property when the injury occurred
in a part of the premises where firemen might reasonably be expected
to be. A fireman performing his duty on private property is an invitee,
not a licensee.2 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
During the feudal period, the proprietary interests of the landowner
were of singular importance and their significance became part of the
English common law, the basis of the American legal system.3 Since
the landowner was considered sovereign within the boundaries of his
property, the rule developed that the landowner owed to a licensee,
who was barely more than a trespasser, 4 only the duty not to cause
him wanton or willful injury.5 Firemen have historically been treated
as a mere licensees to whom no duty of reasonable care has been
extended.6 Because they entered private property at irregular times
1. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded $235,000

damages for his personal injuries. Dini suffered permanent loss of motion

and flexion in the affected parts of his body and a considerable loss of income.
2. The court also overruled Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182
(1892), and other cases by holding that a fireman is entitled to the protection

of generally worded safety ordinances designed to prevent loss of life and

injury in case of fire, and that the common law status of firemen will henceforth be an invitee. Defendant, owner of the hotel, was held liable even

though he had leased the premises at the time of the injury.

3. Ryan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N.E.2d 128 (1942)
(history of common law landowner theory); BOHLEN, TORTS 156-206 (1926);

Bohen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Property of
Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. Rrv. 142, 147 (1921).
4. Bremer v. Lake Erie & W.R.R., 318 Ill. 11, 148 N.E. 862 (1925)

(trespasser

on train killed by engineer's negligence allowed recovery); PROSSER, TORTS §
76 (2d ed. 1955). "A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land
in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the
possessor's consent or otherwise." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 329 (1934).
5. Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1954) (licensee injured
when mule stumbled on railroad, recovery denied); Brauner v. Leutz, 293
Ky. 406, 169 S.W.2d 4 (1943) (painter injured on carpenter's scaffold; held,
licensee and no recovery); POLLOCK, TORTS 405-10 (15th ed. 1951); PRossER,
TORTS § 77 (2d ed. 1955). "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter
or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent, whether given by
invitation or permission." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 330 (1934). There has been
considerable revision of this definition in the tentative draft of the second
Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
6. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955) (fire-
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in carrying out their duties and often without the consent of the
landowner, the courts refused to classify them as invitees. 7 There does
exist, however, a considerable difference of opinion among the courts
as to what constitutes a licensee or invitee.8 Some courts in recent
cases refused to classify firemen as licensees, saying that they are
sui generis. This treatment affords firemen a higher degree of protection and allows recovery where the defect can be characterized as
a trap or nuisance. 9 Other courts, to avoid the harsh common law
rule, have classified firemen as invitees or "business visitors" by
noting certain particular factors of the landowner-fireman relationship
in each case.10 Still other courts have adopted unconditionally the
man injured by collapsing porch of burning building; held, licensee and
denied recovery); Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110

Pac. 203 (1910) (fireman killed by nitric acid while fighting fire at defendant's
plant; held, licensee, recovery denied); Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light &
Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910) (fireman killed by accidental
contact with power lines in yard of burning building; held, licensee and no
recovery); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893) (fireman
injured by building collapse due to large quantity of water on merchandise
therein; held, licensee and recovery denied). See 26 COLUM. L. REV. 116
(1926).
7. Some courts have decided that a fireman should be considered a mere
licensee because of his location at the time of injury, and that he is not to
be protected by safety ordinances intended for employees or lodgers. See,
e.g., Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936)
(fireman using fire escape as vantage point from which to fight nearby fire
injured by fall therefrom; held, licensee, recovery denied); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899) (city fireman injured
by fall through unguarded elevator shaft; held, licensee and outside protective
statute); Beehler v. Daniels, 18 R.I. 563, 29 Atl. 6 (1894) (fireman injured by
fall down unprotected elevator well; held, licensee). But see Drake v. Fenton,
237 Pa. 8, 85 Atl. 14 (1912) and Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106,

8 N.E.2d 296 (1937) wherein the courts allowed firemen to recover for direct
violations of safety ordinances. See CooLEY, TORTS § 251 (4th ed. 1932).

8. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees,
26 MAiN-. L. REV. 573, 576-85 (1942). The economic benefit test for the invitee
classification was previously adopted in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 332 (1934). However, the tentative draft of the second Restatement seems
to have changed to the more lenient "implied invitation" test requiring only
an implied invitation that the land is safe. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §
332. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.12 (1956); 2
POLLOCK, TORTS 392-402 (15th ed. 1951).
9. See, e.g., Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (Sup.
Ct. 1937) (negligent maintenance of gas and oil pumps, tanks; held, a nuisance
and fireman allowed recovery); James v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 66 Ohio App.
87, 31 N.E.2d 872 (1939) (open manhole in gas storage tank called hidden
danger); Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d
549 (1951) (collapsing wall characterized as a trap and fireman, receiving
sui generis classication, allowed recovery); Smith v. Twin State Gas & Elec.
Co., 83 N.H. 439, 144 Atl. 57 (1928) (fireman killed by explosion from leaking
gas main permitted recovery). See also McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor
of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REV.
45 (1936).
10. Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P.2d 562 (1938) (volunteer
fireman designated an invitee as to dangers known by landowner); Zuercher
v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892 (1954) (volunteer
fireman treated as business visitor when on defendant's property to install
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term "invitee- respedting firemen." The majority of courts, however,
continue to classify firemen as licensees under all circumstances, with
the accompanying set of limited rights and duties.'2
In the instant case, the court unequivocally stated that it considered
the fireman to be a member of the invitee class. 13 It observed, after
a review of the cases, that the legal fiction which classifies firemen
as licensees, to whom no duty of reasonable care is owed, is outmoded
and unreasonable. To the court it seemed illogical to say that a
fireman cannot be an invitee because there has been no invitation
given him, yet can be a licensee even though there has been no
license or permission. 14 This lack of logic becomes more evident by
noting that the same courts which have thus disposed of firemen's
cases have not applied the licensee classification to other public
employees, such as postmen and safety inspectors, who are also
required to go on another's property in the performance of their
duties.' 5 Firemen confer on landowners and the general public the
economic benefits and protection which are the traditionally recognized bases for imposing on the landowners the duty of using reasonable care to invitees. 16 To the Illinois court, these reasons were
sufficient to induce it to join the minority of jurisdictions which have
refused to apply the obsolescent classifications and labels of a vastly
different social order to modern problems in the name of stare decisis.
The majority of the court herein noted that from the evidence of
negligent maintenance shown, the jury could have found that the
defendants failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition
and that the hazards of fire and loss of life fighting it were reasonably
7
foreseeable.'
sump pump, recovery allowed).

"A business visitor is a person who is

invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between
them."

RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 332 (1934).

For a recent definition and explana-

tion of invitee and business visitor see the tentative draft of the second Restatement, § 332 cited in note 8 supra. See also Note, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 232
(1943).
11. See, e.g., Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W.
646 (1922) (city fireman working outside city; held, licensee); Taylor v.
Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943) (fireman injured by fall
into pit maintained in public passageway of theatre; held, invitee, recovery
allowed).

Compare with cases cited in note 10 supra where the courts relied

upon specific circumstances to bring the fireman sub judice within the invitee
classification.
12. PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 461-62 (2d ed. 1955). See also 6 DE PAUL L. REV.

97 (1956); 35 MfcH. L. REV. 1157 (1936); 30 Mss. L.J. 340 (1959).
13. 170 N.E.2d at 886.
14. Ibid.
15. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 12 and cases cited therein.

16. Ibid. For an excellent resume of the land occupier's liability in Oregon
today, see Lansing, The Liability of Land Occupier's for Negligence to Persons
on the Land, 1 WILLAMETTE L.J. 314 (1960).
17. The dissent herein, through Justice Klingbiel, agreed that negligence
was shown and that the defendant would be liable for any injury proximately
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The proposition announced by the court in the present case-that
a fireman performing his duty on private property is an invitee-is
most realistic. Perhaps, however, a better approach would be to allow
the fact finder, under proper instructions, to classify the fireman as
invitee or licensee under the facts of each case. Should the fact finder
decide that the landowner could have reasonably foreseen that a
fireman would come upon this portion of his premises in the performance of his duties, then it would impose upon the landowner the
duty owed to an invitee-the use of reasonable care. To deny firemen
the benefit of this determination simply because of arbitrary historical classifications would be to reach an unjustifiable result.
caused by the fire. Klingbiel, however, did not think that the injuries received
by the fireman in this case could be reasonably foreseen as a result of the
mere accumulation of trash and other existent conditions. To extend liability
for every injury which would not have happened but for the fire is, of course,
not reasonable. Where, however, the cause of the injury is a faulty staircase
being constantly used by tenants, it was not unforeseeable that someone,
tenant or fireman, would be injured on this staircase in the event of a fire.

